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In 2015 an estimated 1,011,712 people crossed the 
Mediterranean to Europe in search of safety and a better 
life. 3,770 are known to have died trying to make this 
journey1.  Funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) and the Department for International 
Development (DfID), the MEDMIG project examines 
the dynamics, determinants, drivers and infrastructures 
underpinning this recent migration across, and loss of life in, 
the Mediterranean. 
There was a significant shift in the patterns of boat arrivals to 
Europe during the course of 2015. Whilst most people had 
crossed to Europe via the Central Mediterranean from Libya 
to Italy in 2014, the vast majority (84%) of those arriving by 
boat in 2015 crossed the Aegean from departure points 
dotted along the Turkish coast.  In the last five months of 
2015 the story of Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ – which had 
been dominated by the stories of hundreds of people 
drowning in the Mediterranean seas between Libya and Italy 
earlier in the year – came to be dominated by images of 
thousands of people arriving every day in Greece. In August 
2015 more than 100,000 people arrived on the Greek 
islands, a significant increase on the 54,000 that had arrived 
the previous month. In the month of October, that figure 
doubled again to more than 200,000 people. The majority 
of people arrived on the small island of Lesvos (population 
of 86,000), with smaller numbers of people arriving on Kos, 
Chios and Samos (Figure 1).  
This Research Brief presents our emerging findings in 
relation to refugees and migrants2 who travelled via the 
Eastern Mediterranean Route from Turkey to Greece during 
2015. An accompanying Research Brief (No. 3) sets out our 
findings from the Central Mediterranean Route. The Brief 
focuses on four main themes:
• The factors affecting the decision to leave;
• Journeys and routes taken to reach Greece; 
• Intended destinations of those migrating; and
• The use of smugglers to facilitate the journey. 
Introduction
1
1 See IOM (2016) Mixed Migration: Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information 2015. Geneva: IOM (GMDAC)   
   https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/Mixed-Flows-Mediterranean-and-Beyond-Compilation-Overview-2015.pdf 
2  We use the term ‘refugees and migrants’ throughout this Research Brief to reflect the nature of ‘mixed flows’ across the Mediterranean.
Figure 1: Arrivals to Greece across the Eastern Mediterranean Route, Jan-Dec 2015 (UNHCR 2016)
Understanding the dynamics of migration across the 
Mediterranean and the fears, needs and aspirations of 
those who move provides new insights which can inform 
the development of more effective policy responses. We 
conclude the Brief by considering four key challenges for 
policymakers arising from the findings of our research. Our 
intended audiences include: policymakers and officials 
from EU governments, policymakers and officials from the 
European Commission, European Council, officials from 
UN bodies, in particular UNHCR,  and Non-Governmental 
and Civil Society Organisations working with refugees and 
migrants. 
The research took place between September 2015 and 
January 2016 when arrivals of women, men and children 
into the EU via southern Europe reached their peak. We 
conducted 500 interviews with refugees and migrants 
arriving into Greece, Italy, Malta and Turkey, and more 
than 100 interviews with a range of stakeholders. We also 
 
observed ‘the crisis’ as it unfolded, including political and 
policy responses at the local, national and international 
levels. This Research Brief draws on: 
• Data from interviews with 215 refugees and migrants 
interviewed in Greece (Athens and the island of Lesvos);
• Data from 28 in-depth interviews with stakeholders 
from government, international organisations and civil 
society; and 
• A desk-based review of the existing literature3. 
The profile of refugees and migrants we interviewed broadly 
reflects the composition of those arriving into Greece in 
2015: almost half (45%) of the respondents were Syrian, 
20% were Afghan and 13% Iraqi (Figure 1). This compares 
with 56%, 24% and 10% respectively of overall arrivals to 
Greece during 2015. The majority (85%) of respondents 
were male but many were travelling in families with wives 
and children.
2
3  Further information about the project can be found at the end of this Brief and on our website www.medmig.info 
Figure 2: Nationality of respondents interviewed in Greece (n=215)
Whilst the factors driving migration across the Mediterranean 
are complex, our research confirms that conflict in the 
countries neighbouring Europe, most notably the conflict 
in Syria which started in March 2011, was a major factor 
contributing to the significant increase in people arriving in 
Greece during 2015. When we asked our respondents to 
describe the circumstances under which they had decided to 
leave, the vast majority (88%) explicitly mentioned factors that 
could be described as ‘forced migration’ including  conflict, 
persecution, violence, death threats and human rights abuse. 
This does not necessarily mean that the other 12% did not 
experience conflict, persecution, violence, death threats and 
human rights abuse but rather that they did not explicitly 
discuss these issues with the interviewer. 
Within this, the particular circumstances under which people 
had been forced to leave varied according to the country 
context, and in relation to the individual, familial and group 
characteristics of respondents. For example, some of our 
respondents were persecuted by state agencies for their 
involvement in conventional political activity or the activities 
of family members. These included: a member of the 
opposition Pakistan People’s Party in Pakistan; a Syrian 
who was arrested and imprisoned because the authorities 
thought he would participate in a political protest; an MP 
who opposed the actions of the Assad regime; an Airforce 
Colonel who was tortured for refusing to drop barrel bombs; 
and a former solider in Assad’s army who left and became 
a founder of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Respondents who 
had been journalists, humanitarian and NGO workers and 
activists were also targeted in Syria and Iraq. In some cases, 
the persecution was perpetrated by non-state actors. For 
instance, one of our Somali respondents had fled Somalia 
when his father was killed by Al-Shabaab as a result of his 
work for the Somalian Information Office. 
Nationality Number %
Syrian 84 87.5
Afghan (in Iran and  
Afghanistan) 
39 88.6
Iraqi 27 93.1
Eritrean 21 100
Yemeni 9 90
Somali 5 100
Stateless (in Syria) 3 100
Palestinian (in Syria) 1 100
Pakistani 1 50
Others 0 0
Total 190 88.4%
Table 1: Conflict, human rights abuse and persecution given 
as reason for migration (by nationality)
The decision to leave 
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Key points
The vast majority (88%) of those interviewed in Greece told us they were forced to leave their home countries or the countries in 
which they were living due to conflict, persecution, violence, death threats and human rights abuse. Within this, the circumstances 
under which people had been forced to leave varied considerably. 
More than a quarter (28%) of respondents said that the activities of Islamic State (IS), particularly in Syria but also in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Yemen, were a significant factor in their decision to leave.
Respondents from Syria and Iraq described kidnapping by a range of different state and non-state actors as an increasingly common 
threat to their safety and that of their families.
For Eritreans, Syrians and Afghans (living in Iran), the risk / fear of forced conscription into the government army, militia or rebel 
force was a major factor underlying the decision to leave. 
Some respondents from minority groups (e.g. Hazara Afghans in Iran, Christians in Eritrea, Palestinians in Syria) described 
experiences of severe institutionalised discrimination, usually on the basis of ethnic or religious identity.  
Not everyone had been individually targeted. Many 
respondents said that they had left their countries because 
the violence had become intolerable and they consequently 
feared for their personal safety and that of their families.  
These included a large number of Syrians who were living in 
areas of conflict and who were subject to almost daily barrel 
bombings, sniper fire and other attacks. 
            I was living in Damascus. The situation was bad. I was  
              working as a civil servant for 16 years. We were living on 
rent, expensive rent. The schools closed down. The regime was 
dropping bombs every day. There was no future there. I decided to 
leave one year ago from Syria for my children. Everybody leaves 
Syria for the sake of their children.”
(Syrian man aged 35 travelling to Germany to join his wife and 
four children)
Beyond these generalised experiences, there were four 
key issues that affected a significant proportion of those 
interviewed: the impact of IS, kidnapping, risk / fear of indefinite 
forced conscription and severe institutionalised discrimination. 
More than a quarter (28%) of respondents said that a 
significant factor in their decision to leave was the activities of 
IS, particularly in Syria but also in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. 
These respondents had been detained, tortured or forced 
to watch beheadings by IS. They expressed grave concerns 
for the safety of their families, and particularly women (wives, 
sisters, daughters) who were perceived to be non-compliant 
with strict Sharia laws concerning their dress and behaviour. 
Respondents from Syria and Iraq also described kidnapping 
by state and non-state actors (including a range of militia 
groups) as an increasingly common threat to their safety and 
that of their families. In some cases individuals were targeted 
because they were perceived to be a political threat. More 
commonly however people were targeted because they had 
resources and were viewed as being able to pay a significant 
ransom. Those with resources were most at risk. 
             I was living in Damascus. I was scared about my  
               daughter’s life. We were rich, and whoever is rich is in 
danger of having their children kidnapped”
(Palestinian Syrian woman aged 43 travelling with her six year 
old daughter)
For Eritreans, Syrians and those Afghans who had been 
living in Iran, the risk / fear of forced conscription into the 
government army, militia or rebel force was a major factor 
underlying the decision to leave. Eritreans in particular 
described military conscription as a form of forced or slave 
labour with poor quality working conditions, low or no salary 
and no prospects of release4. Several Afghans, including one 
child aged 16, told us that they had been forcibly conscripted 
into the Iranian army to support the Assad regime in Syria5. 
Finally, respondents from minority groups described 
experiences of severe institutionalised discrimination, usually 
on the basis of religious or ethnic identity.  The clearest 
example is that of Afghans living – and in some cases born 
- in Iran5. Whilst all Afghans appear to experience varying 
degrees of discrimination in Iran, the situation appears to be 
particularly difficult for the Hazara because they are more 
easily identifiable due to their distinctive physical appearance7. 
4  UN Human Rights Council (2015) Report of Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea /HRC/29/42  
   http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIEritrea/Pages/ReportCoIEritrea.aspx  
5  Iran is fighting a proxy war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) has recruited thousands of undocumented    
   Afghans living there to fight in Syria since at least November 2013  See https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria  
6  More than three quarters (77%) of Afghan nationals interviewed in Greece had spent a considerable period of time in Iran (years rather than months) and  
   several were born there.
7  See Human Rights Watch (2013) Unwelcome Guests: Iran’s Violation of Afghan Refugee and Migrant Rights, available at  
   https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iran1113_forUpload_0.pdf   
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Media coverage of the arrival of refugees and migrants 
in Greece during 2015 gave the impression of a linear, 
uninterrupted movement of people heading towards Europe8. 
This was often represented through graphics depicting 
arrows from North Africa and the Middle East into Greece 
and Italy which heightened public anxiety and was used by 
the political right to stoke fears about the potential welfare 
and security implications. 
But these stories and images of ‘mass movement’ into 
Europe conceal a much more complex picture.  There 
are around 6.1 million refugees and 11 million displaced 
persons in the region (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Iraq 
and Syria) only a minority of whom move onwards to Europe. 
Understanding the decisions, needs and aspirations of those 
who move enables a more effective policy response. 
Our respondents had travelled through 21 countries prior to 
reaching Greece and they had travelled along 26 different 
routes.  It is clear from their accounts of the journey that 
they did not always set out with a clear plan in mind to reach 
Europe, rather their plans developed and changed over time 
as opportunities arose or were closed down. 
 
For those coming from countries which border Turkey (Syria, 
Iraq and Iran) journeys were mostly straightforward, if often 
dangerous9. Women, men and family groups crossed land 
borders into Turkey, mainly at Kilis and Gazientep, travelling 
onwards to the coast via Ankara, Istanbul and Antakya. 
Some Syrians however stayed first in Lebanon, Jordan 
Egypt and even Yemen and Libya, before finally moving on 
to Turkey. For others coming from countries which do not 
neighbour Turkey, the journey was much more complex. 
In particular, Eritrean nationals travelled through several 
countries, including Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and Egypt 
before finally turning towards Europe. 
Our findings challenge the idea that all those arriving in 
Europe in 2015 crossed all the borders on their journey 
irregularly (without passports or visas). Many respondents 
were able to travel to and enter Turkey with a passport10. 
There were however significant differences by nationality 
depending on access to documents and other resources. 
Among the Syrian interviewees there was a mixture of people 
who entered Turkey regularly and those who crossed the 
border irregularly. None of the Afghans had permission to 
enter Turkey: all entered irregularly. 
8 See, for example, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35486655 in the UK and  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/world/europe/a-mass- 
  migration-crisis-and-it-may-yet-get-worse.html?_r=0 in the US. Many more examples can be found through a simple google search of ‘migration to Europe’.
9 Although there have been reports that the border between Turkey and Syria became increasingly difficult to cross in 2015 (see, for example Human Rights      
  Watch https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/23/turkey-syrians-pushed-back-border) our research was conducted prior to the escalation of border closures  
  associated with the EU-Turkey agreement (see, for example, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/27/dispatches-isis-advance-traps-165000-syrians-closed- 
  turkish-border)
10 It should be noted that in January 2016 Turkey imposed new visa restrictions on Syrians entering the country which has made it considerably more  
  difficult to cross the border including for those with passports http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-new-visa-law-for-syrians-enters-into-force.
  aspx?pageID=238&nID=93642&NewsCatID=352
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Journeys and routes 
Key points
The representation of the movements of refugees and migrants as a linear, singular uninterrupted flow of people heading toward 
Europe is grossly misleading. Rather there is significant diversity in the routes taken, the number of countries traversed and time 
spent there and a mix of regular and irregular movement within the whole journey. 
Our findings challenge the idea that all those arriving in Europe crossed all the borders on their journey irregularly (without passports 
or visas). Some respondents were able to travel regularly for part of the journey. 
Many respondents did not intend to travel to Europe when they first left their countries of origin but moved on due to secondary 
factors (lack of rights, limited access to employment, health, education, discrimination and harassment). Some people also expressed 
security concerns. These factors propelled them onwards. 
More than two thirds of Iraqi nationals entered Turkey legally 
using a passport and either flew to Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir 
or took a coach into Turkey. 
Finally, many respondents had not intended to travel to 
Europe when they first left their countries of origin: rather the 
journey to Greece was part of a longer term trajectory. 
Of our 215 respondents, 45 travelled through Iran, 32 
through Lebanon and 22 through Sudan. Of these most 
Afghans, several Syrians and most Eritreans had stayed in 
Iran, Lebanon and Sudan respectively for significant periods 
of time, years rather than months. Our interviewees stayed 
in Turkey between two days and several years. Nearly half 
(44%) of all those who were interviewed in Greece did not 
travel straight onwards, but instead stopped to work or stay 
with friends or family while deciding what to do and where to 
go next. 
Hence, there are secondary factors determining onward 
migration from the first countries of arrival. These factors 
include a lack of access to, or quality of, protection or status, 
unviable economic conditions, ethnic discrimination, police 
harassment, racism and racial violence, civil war in the case 
of Eritreans in Sudan and lack of language proficiency (all 
nationalities).
            [We went to] Gaziantep. We stayed for 11 months. I ran out 
              of money. …I couldn’t find a job there”
(Syrian man aged 30 travelling with his wife and seven 
children)
 I went to Sudan and worked. I was doing pretty well. Five 
 months ago I had to leave because of the civil war and 
went to find my way to Europe” 
(Eritrean man aged 44 travelling alone)
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7There is a widely held belief amongst European politicians 
and some sections of the media that refugees and migrants 
have a sufficiently detailed knowledge about migration policy 
in the countries of Europe to make rational and informed 
choices about their intended destinations. The impression 
given is that the vast majority of refugees and migrants 
in Africa and the Middle East are on their way to Europe, 
‘pulled’ by the prospect of securing jobs and access to 
welfare support. There is also a perception that the significant 
increase in arrivals to Greece was caused largely by refugees 
and migrants wanting to travel to Germany following the 
decision by German Chancellor Angela  Merkel to suspend 
the Dublin Regulation at the beginning of September 201511.  
We asked our respondents about their intended destination 
when they departed from their country of origin12. 
Nearly a fifth (16%) of those who responded said that 
‘Europe’, rather than a particular country, was their intended 
destination. This was particularly the case for those from 
Eritrea and also for those with limited education, some of 
whom did not realise that Europe is made up of a number 
of different countries. For them, as for the majority of 
respondents, the most important priority was to reach a 
country in which they felt safe. Freedom from racism and 
discrimination was also an important factor, particularly for 
those respondents, such as the Hazara Afghans, for whom 
discrimination had driven their decision to move from Iran.
 I wanted to go to a country where we can live as human 
 beings. I wanted to live in a country with peace and 
justice. I had no specific country in mind.”
(Afghan man aged 26 years)
Others mentioned a total of 24 different countries as intended 
destinations, not all of which were within the EU. Germany 
received the highest proportion of mentions (32%), followed 
by Sweden (12%), the UK (6%), Switzerland (4%), Denmark 
and Norway (both 3%). Other intended destinations included 
Turkey, Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Austria, 
the United States, Italy, France, Canada, Australia, Iran, 
Lebanon, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Luxembourg. 
11 Until this point, all those seeking protection under international refugee law had been required to claim asylum in the first EU country in which they arrived.
12 The research in Greece was conducted from September 2015 to January 2016 prior to the closure of the FYROM border when onward travel through the 
    Balkans to other European countries remained possible.
Intended destinations
Key points
For the majority of respondents the most important priority was to reach a country in which they felt safe.
Nearly a fifth (16%) of those who responded said that ‘Europe’, rather than a particular country, was their intended destination. Of 
those who referred to specific destinations, Germany received the highest proportion of mentions (32%), followed by Sweden (12%), 
the UK (6%), Switzerland (4%), Denmark and Norway (both 3%). 
Although some people perceived that Germany would be more welcoming than other countries, evidence that refugees and migrants 
were drawn to Germany by the decision to suspend the Dublin Regulation was much less pronounced than anticipated.
The presence of family members or other social contacts (friends, acquaintances) was the most important factor for nearly two 
thirds (59%) of those who mentioned an intended destination. 
Refugees and migrants have only partial information about migration policies in particular countries. Policies relating to refugee 
status and family reunion were more important than access to welfare support in shaping intended destinations. 
“
It is important to note that many people mentioned multiple 
intended destinations rather than a single country, indicating 
that they had not yet made a decision about where they
would go but were waiting further information or advice at the 
point at which we interviewed them. 
Our research confirms that for some people there was a 
perception that Germany would be the most welcoming 
country. This perception was particularly evident among 
Syrians, which accounts for the high number of mentions of 
Germany, but also some Afghan and Iraqi respondents.
 We want to go to Germany. Everybody is saying good 
 things about Germany. It  accepts refugees. They also 
told us that the asylum procedure doesn’t last long there. We also 
heard that you get a salary and you are provided with a house if 
your asylum application is approved. We searched about those 
things on Google” 
(Syrian woman aged 31 years, travelling with her husband 
and three children under three years old)
Despite this, our findings challenge the idea that European 
asylum and migration policy is the only or most important
factor influencing the intended destinations of refugees and
migrants. There are a number of reasons why.
Firstly, for respondents who had travelled to Greece via 
the Eastern Mediterranean Route the presence of family 
members or other social contacts (friends, acquaintances) in 
European countries appears to shape and inform intended 
destinations above all other factors. This was particularly 
evident among Syrian respondents, many of whom 
maintained almost daily contact with relatives and friends 
(by telephone, Facebook, Whatsapp and Viber), but could 
also be seen among Afghans (travelling both directly from 
Afghanistan and Iran) and Iraqis.  Relationships with family 
and friends living in specific European countries meant that 
some people were sent resources for the journey and that 
others felt more confident about what would happen to them 
on arrival. 
 My brother is a recognised refugee in Norway. If I 
 succeed, I want to go there so that we can help each other”
(Eritrean man aged 34 travelling alone)
This finding contrasts strongly with our findings in relation 
to the Central Mediterranean route, where the presence of 
friends or family members in particular countries appears to 
be a far less significant factor shaping intended destinations 
(See Research Brief No 3.)
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13 For a detailed analysis of the ways in which Syrian refugees use smartphone technology and social media networks see Gillespie, M., Ampofo, L.,  
   Cheesman, M., Faith, B., Iliadou, E., Issa, A., Osseiran, S. and Skleparis, D., (2016) Mapping Refugee Media Journeys, The Open University / France Médias  
   Monde http://www.open.ac.uk/ccig/sites/www.open.ac.uk.ccig/files/Mapping%20Refugee%20Media%20Journeys%2016%20May%20FIN%20MG_0.pdf 
Figure 3: Intended destination country (% of mentions)
Secondly, our research found that refugees and migrants 
have limited information about migration policies in particular 
countries. The extent to which people are able to access 
information about asylum and migration policies depends, 
in significant part, on their economic, social and cultural 
capital, including the ability to access online digital sources of 
information. In the very rapidly changing policy environment 
seen during 2015 it often proved difficult, even for those with 
smartphones, to access accurate up-to-date information.  
In this context decisions about intended destinations may be 
shaped by ad hoc information and chance encounters from 
those who have already arrived to Europe or are travelling 
along the same route. Where specific migration policies 
were cited they more frequently related to opportunities to 
secure refugee status and family reunification. These in turn 
were related to the desire of our respondents to support 
themselves after arrival. 
 In the beginning, I wanted to go to Denmark, but later I  
 changed my mind. Now I want to go to Finland...In 
Athens, I met a guy who lived for 10 years in Finland and he told 
some things about the country. That’s how I changed my mind and 
decided to go to Finland” 
(Syrian man aged 25 years travelling alone)
Finally, our research found that decisions about intended 
destinations are also influenced by perceptions of the 
economic situation in particular countries and opportunities to 
access employment. Whilst some respondents talked about 
the importance of allowances, housing support and access 
to medical treatment these factors were not as significant 
as the ability to secure a residence permit (often expressed 
as ‘papers’) and the right to work. These people cannot be 
described as ‘economic migrants’ as they had been forced to 
leave their countries of origin but having lost everything they 
were determined to find a place to live in which they would 
have the greatest opportunity to rebuild their lives.
 I am just looking for peace and a job. I would stay in any  
 place in Europe that could offer me these two things” 
(Palestinian Syrian man aged 52)
 So the last two to three months I started thinking of 
 going to Germany. It’s good there and there are jobs 
available. Germany has more employment opportunities than the 
rest of the countries in Europe”
(Syrian man aged 36)
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Political leaders and large sections of the media from across 
Europe have repeatedly referred to smugglers as ‘criminals’ 
and / or ‘traffickers’. Our research strongly suggests that 
smugglers were a necessity for our respondents to reach a 
place of safety. All of our respondents engaged a smuggler 
for at least one stage of their journey. All but one hired a 
smuggler to cross the Aegean Sea14. Our research found two 
main reasons why our respondents engaged the services of 
smugglers. 
Firstly, and contrary to what is often assumed, the services 
of smugglers were as frequently engaged by individuals to 
help them leave their homes, as they were to avoid border 
controls and enter a country irregularly. This was either 
because the government or authority in the country in which 
they were living forbade departure or otherwise imposed 
travel restrictions (e.g. parts of Syria, Eritrea, Iran), or because 
travelling was dangerous and required personal security (e.g. 
Syria, Eritrea). 
Almost half (43%) of those interviewed in Greece had used 
a smuggler in order to escape the country in which they 
were living. This included over a third of Syrians (including 
Palestinian Syrians) who had used a smuggler in order to 
leave Syria. Interviewees paid individuals to smuggle them 
out of areas of conflict or under siege (e.g. Aleppo, Daraa, 
Homs), or cities under IS control from which it was forbidden 
to leave (e.g. Deir Al-Zor, Raqqa). 
All the Afghan nationals we interviewed who had been living 
in Iran prior to their departure started their journeys with 
smuggler, usually from Teheran and often in the boot of a car.
This was because it is illegal for Afghans to travel from city 
to city within Iran, making internal travel within the country 
dangerous 15. Smugglers guided Afghan interviewees past the 
Iranian army who are believed to shoot those trying to exit Iran 
through the mountains into Turkey.
 There is nothing left after 5 years of war. Yet in order to 
 leave, I had to go through IS checkpoints. My plan was 
to go to Lebanon and find a job there. We went by car to another 
area in Raqqa which was controlled by the regime. We paid a 
smuggler 50 dollars per person. The car was full of clothes, and we 
were hidden among these clothes. It was a transportation vehicle 
supposedly. We first went to Palmyra, and from there to Damascus. 
We were stopped in Palmyra and asked where I was going and 
why I was leaving. It wasn’t allowed to leave the city if you are 
younger than 40 years old. In case you are stopped, you must not 
say that you are going to Lebanon. I told them that we were going 
to another city controlled by IS. The regime stopped us too. They 
checked our IDs. They cross check your ID in a computer, and if 
you are ‘clean’ they let you go. We arrived in Damascus and we 
went by coach to the border with Lebanon.” 
(Syrian man, travelling with wife and four children aged under 
11)
14  One respondent, an Afghan national, had bought his own boat with a group of friends. En route to Greece they lost their way and he expressed regret to the 
    interviewer that he had not instead hired the services of a smuggler. 
15  See fn.7
The use of smugglers
Key points
All of our respondents engaged a smuggler for at least one stage of their journey. All except one hired a smuggler to cross the Aegean Sea.
People engaged the services of smugglers for two main reasons: firstly, in order to escape danger or because it was illegal/ forbidden 
to leave the country in which they were living and secondly, because of the inability to obtain a passport or visa which would allow 
them to access a safe and legal route to protection.
One in ten of our respondents told us that they had tried but failed to migrate legally, for example, through applying for a student or 
work visa, UN resettlement or family reunification. Others considered this option but decided it was unlikely to be successful.
 
“
 I left Tehran 22 days ago. I took my Afghan passport with  
 me. I found a smuggler in Tehran. He was the same 
smuggler that my brother used in order to go to Germany. From 
Tehran we went to Urmia. We went by car. We changed five cars in 
order to reach Urmia. And we had to switch off our mobile phones. 
We had to follow these steps in order to avoid army detection.”
(Afghan Pashtun man, living in Iran for 10 years and travelling 
with his cousin) 
Similarly, all but one of the Eritrean men and women we 
interviewed paid smugglers in order to escape Eritrea, either 
because they had fled army conscription and / or it is illegal 
to cross the border out Eritrea 16. Eritrean interviewees also 
specifically referred to hiring smugglers to help them avoid the 
risks of being kidnapped, extorted or murdered on the border 
between Eritrea and Sudan 17.
Secondly, our respondents’ inability to obtain a passport / and 
or visa to enter a country of protection meant that they had no 
alternative other than to engage the services of a smuggler to 
get to Greece. One in ten of our interviewees told us that they 
had tried but failed to migrate legally, for example, through 
applying for a work or student visa, UN resettlement or family 
reunification. Others considered this option but decided it was 
unlikely to be successful. For the most part however there 
were no operating embassies or consulates from which our 
respondents could seek a visa at the time of departure. For 
instance, there are currently no Western embassies operating 
in Syria, and Syrians are only able to apply for visas from 
embassies in Beirut (Lebanon) or Amman (Jordan). In other 
cases, applying for a passport would have been dangerous 
as this would alert the authorities to an intent to leave, for 
instance from Eritrea. Several respondents directly expressed 
a wish that they could have been able to obtain a visa, and 
therefore not needed to hire a smuggler. 
 I didn’t try to apply for visa. Nobody gets a visa. I wish 
 we could pay the embassy instead of the smuggler in 
order to come here”  (Syrian man travelling alone) 
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“ 
“ 
16  See fn.4
17 See http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sudan-rashaida-kidnappers-demand-5000-
ransom-threaten-death-eritrean-captives-1504974
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We conclude this Research Brief with a discussion of four 
key challenges for policymakers that arise from the findings 
of this research: firstly, the need to better understand the 
overlaps between forced and economic migration and their 
implications for policy making; secondly, the protracted and 
increasingly fragmented nature of journeys and the ways 
in which policies intended to restrict flows can increase the 
use of smugglers; thirdly, the failure at the national and EU 
level to address the crisis of refugee protection which was 
particularly evident in the Greek context; and finally, the 
disconnect between the drivers of migration and EU policies 
of containment. 
Beyond forced vs. economic migration 
As was noted in our first Brief18, there is a complex 
relationship between forced and economic drivers of 
migration to Europe. Contrary to dominant political and 
media representations, migration across the Mediterranean 
in 2015 did not consist of a single coherent flow but rather 
was made up of a number of distinct ‘sub-flows’ from many 
countries and regions, and included individuals and families 
with diverse trajectories. These flows merged in Turkey and 
Libya explaining, in part at least, the magnitude of arrivals 
in Greece and Italy in 2015. Our respondents in Greece 
included Syrians who had come directly from Syria but 
also others from the Gulf countries, where they had been 
labour migrants, and others who had been living as refugees 
in Lebanon or Turkey, as well as Afghans who had come 
directly from Afghanistan, but also from Iran where they had 
been living for many years, or had even been born.
Whilst the vast majority of those arriving in Greece during 
2015 came from countries in which there was well-
documented human insecurity, it is impossible to fully 
appreciate the complex drivers of migration during this period 
without examining the ways in which forced and economic 
factors come together to shape the experiences of those 
on the move. The longer people are on the move the more 
complicated – and difficult to unpack – these relationships 
become.
18  Crawley, H. et al (2016) Unpacking a rapidly changing scenario: migration flows, routes and trajectories across the Mediterranean, MEDMIG Research Brief  
    No.1 http://www.medmig.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/MEDMIG-Briefing-01-March-2016-FINAL-1.pdf 
Implications for policy 
Key points
There is a complex relationship between forced and economic drivers of migration to Europe. This is particularly evident where 
conflict has undermined livelihoods but can also be seen among those who flee due to conflict but are unable to survive elsewhere. 
The pressures that propel people forward on their journeys towards Europe are likely to persist. Efforts on the part of the EU to 
significantly expand the opportunities for access to protection through safe and legal routes have met with limited success. In this 
context the use of smugglers will continue and most likely increase.
There has been a failure at the national and EU levels to address the protection needs of those arriving from situations of conflict, 
persecution and human rights abuse. The Greek government’s approach was undermined by political difficulties, a lack of effective 
planning and economic crisis.  The EU has focused almost exclusively on policies designed to contain refugees and migrants in 
Turkey and Greece, thereby stemming the flow into other parts of Europe.
The extent to which the policy of containment continues to reduce flows to Greece and the EU remains to be seen. Much will depend 
upon the evolving situation in Turkey following the attempted coup and whether the underlying factors driving migration across the 
Aegean (conflict, persecution, human rights abuse) are addressed.
become. One of the consequences is that people may feel 
that they have no alternative other than to move even if they 
are not specifically targeted or, as yet, directly affected. 
This is particularly clear in the context of Syria where 
protracted conflict has undermined the ability to earn a 
livelihood and feed a family by killing primary breadwinners, 
destroying businesses and making it impossible to travel 
to work. The conflict has also devastated the economic 
infrastructure of the country, increasing the prices of basic 
goods and commodities including food and oil. In Syria, price 
increases have been exacerbated by internal displacement 
and the movement of large numbers of people to some of the 
safer cities. Many respondents told us that they had taken the 
decision to move for economic reasons but it was conflict that 
had created their economic insecurity. 
It is also clear from our research that many of those who 
leave situations of conflict find themselves in very difficult 
economic circumstances in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iran 
and elsewhere as a result of limited rights, exploitation by 
employers and discrimination in the labour market (and 
beyond). These circumstances propel them onwards. A third 
(34%) of respondents had moved on for what might typically 
be understood as economic reasons: they were running 
out of money, found it impossible to secure employment or 
were working long hours for very little pay. With the passage 
of time, and in the absence of a resolution to the conflicts 
in their home countries, respondents told us that they had 
grown increasingly concerned about the impacts on their 
families, and especially their children, many of whom had 
been out of schools for many years or had health issues.  The 
arrival of significant numbers of people in Greece in 2015 
therefore raises important questions about the long-term 
situation for refugees and migrants living in countries such as 
Turkey, a significant proportion of whom decided to cross the 
Mediterranean in 201519.
A lack of safe and legal routes
The pressures that propel people to leave their homes 
are likely to persist. Despite this, efforts on the part of the 
European Union to significantly expand the opportunities for 
access to protection through safe and legal routes have met 
with limited success. In May 2015 the European Commission 
presented a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration 
which recognised the need to avoid those fleeing conflict and 
in need of protection having to resort to smugglers. Since 
that time just 8,268 people have been resettled, mainly from 
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, under a scheme established in 
July 2015 to provide places for 22,504 persons in clear need 
of international protection20. A further 802 Syrian refugees 
have also been resettled from Turkey under the EU-Turkey 
agreement21 and 2,682 have been resettled to the UK under 
the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Relocation scheme22.  At the 
same time there is evidence that it has become more difficult 
for Syrians to access work permits and visas for family reunion 
as the conflict has progressed. In the UK for example the 
refusal rate for Syrian visa applications has more than doubled 
from less than 30% before the conflict started to more than 
60% in 201623.
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19 About 2.8 million refugees are registered in Turkey (2.5 million from Syria) between a quarter and a third of whom crossed the Aegean in 2015.  Figures  
   available at Department General for Migration Management (2016), Statistics. Ankara: DGMM, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/migration-statistics_915_1024  It  
   should be noted however that many Syrians are not registered and neither are registered Syrians deregistered once they have left. As a result these figures  
   are widely considered unreliable.
20 Figures correct as of 13th July 2016. See European Commission (2016) Fifth Report on Relocation and Resettlement available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
   dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160713/fifth_report_on_relocation_and_ 
   resettlement_en.pdf  
21 The EU-Turkey Statement of 18th March 2016 provides that for every Syrian being returned from Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be  
   resettled from Turkey to the EU. Priority is given to refugees who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly.
22 2,682 people were granted humanitarian protection under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme in the year end June 2016 (2,898 since  
   the scheme began in January 2014). See https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/ 
   migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/august2016 
23 See https://www.freemovement.org.uk/refusal-rate-for-syrian-visa-applications-increases-yet-further/
The findings of our research suggest that the failure of the 
European Union to provide safe and legal routes to protection 
has not only jeopardised the safety of refugees and migrants 
but has also significantly increased the use of smugglers 
who have become the only option for those unable to leave 
their countries or enter countries in which protection might 
potentially be available to them.  This directly undermines one 
of the stated objectives of the European Migration Agenda. 
Whilst the European Commission is committed, in principle, 
to significantly increasing the scale of resettlement through 
establishing a common EU Resettlement Framework24, the 
extent to which this policy objective can be delivered in the 
current political context is questionable particularly given the 
lack of consensus between EU Member States on the issues 
of resettlement and relocation.. 
Access to refugee protection
Despite overwhelming evidence that the drivers of migration to 
Greece in 2015 were primarily related to conflict, persecution 
and human rights abuse, there has been a  failure at the 
national and EU levels to address the protection needs of 
those arriving. This was the result of two main factors. On 
the one hand there was an economic, and ultimately political, 
crisis in Greece which significantly undermined the ability of the 
Greek government to respond appropriately to the protection 
needs of refugees. At the same time EU politicians and policy 
makers became fixated with the idea that the rapid increase in 
arrivals to Greece represented a crisis of migration control and 
determined to reduce the flow at all costs. 
During its election campaign in the end of 2014 and early 
2015, SYRIZA had embarked on a bold 180-degree turn away 
from indiscriminate 18-month detention policies and restrictive 
migration laws which had characterised successive previous 
governments’ approach25. Shortly after taking power, the 
(former) Deputy Minister for Immigration Policy announced that 
refugees and migrants who were previously detained would 
be accommodated in ‘open hospitality centres’. These were to 
be created in empty public buildings, vacant apartments and 
former military camps. Subsequently, in March 2015 an official 
document (allegedly a ministerial circular) was leaked, which 
specified that asylum seekers who enter the country irregularly 
would not be detained at the borders; instead they would be 
provided with a document which instructed them to leave the 
country in thirty days. This was widely viewed as an unofficial 
‘travel document’ enabling people to transit through Greece. 
These moves constituted a major shift in Greek migration 
policies. 
In the following four weeks thousands of asylum seekers, 
mainly vulnerable groups who had been detained for more 
than six months, were gradually released with a six month 
residence permit but no right to work. Consequently, by 
April 2015, a large number of asylum seekers were living 
on the streets of downtown Athens. These individuals were 
quickly joined by significant numbers of newly arrived Syrians, 
Afghans, and Iraqis, coming from the islands.
While bold, the Greek government’s new approach 
was undermined by a lack of effective planning. Despite 
announcing the end of detention, no plans were made at that 
time for infrastructure to support those released. There was 
already evidence by January 2015 that the newly elected 
Greek government underestimated the clear signs of a 
significant increase in movement of people into the EU via 
Greece. As numbers began to rise through the spring and 
escalated during the summer months, efforts to develop an 
effective state-led emergency humanitarian response were 
hampered by five years of austerity measures, a political 
focus on the EU relationship and bail-out and a lack of clarity 
(and some conflict) in respective responsibilities between the 
Ministry of Migration which had been created in January 2015, 
the Ministry for Citizen Rights, Public Order and Police and 
the Ministry for Defence. Chaotic scenes on the beaches of 
Lesvos and the other Greek islands that dominated the media 
during the latter half of 2015 were an inevitable consequence.
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24 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2434_en.htm 
25 See Skleparis, D. 2016. (In)securitization and illiberal practices on the fringe of the EU. European Security, 25(1), 92-111. In early February 2015, former  
   Deputy Interior Minister for Public Order and Civil Protection visited the ‘Amygdaleza’ detention centre after the suicide of a Pakistani detainee and proclaimed 
   the closure of centre. Kathimerini, 2015. Migrant centers to be shut down after suicide, 14th February, available at http://www.ekathimerini.com/167320/ 
   article/ekathimerini/news/migrant-centers-to-be-shut-down-after-suicide  
The politics and policies of containment
The European Union meanwhile, has focused almost 
exclusively on stopping the flows from Turkey to the EU 
and, in turn, attempting to reduce the political crisis with 
which migration across the Mediterranean has come to be 
associated. This is reflected in the introduction of policies 
at the national and EU levels designed to contain refugees 
and migrants in Turkey and Greece, thereby stemming 
the flow into other parts of Europe.  From November 
2015 onwards, the Balkan route was successively closed 
culminating in the complete closure of the border between 
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) on 9th March 2016. At the same time NATO and 
an increasingly number of Frontex vessels were deployed 
in the Aegean and detention was effectively reintroduced 
on the Greek islands through the development of closed 
reception centres (‘hotspots’). Then, on 18th March 2016, 
Turkey was declared a ‘safe third country’ as a result of the 
EU-Turkey agreement to end irregular migration from Turkey 
to the EU26. Everyone who arrives in Greece is required to 
go through an expedited procedure. Those who do not 
apply for asylum or whose applications are to be considered 
unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the Asylum 
Procedures Directive are supposed to be readmitted to 
Turkey, although Greek adjudicators often reject this view 
and do not order return27. In Turkey meanwhile visas were 
introduced for Syrians from third countries, borders closed 
and law enforcement measures enhanced (beaches raided 
and the activities of smugglers supressed). There were 
also some efforts to improve conditions (for example, the 
introduction of access to work permits for Syrians). 
These measures, aimed at reducing flows from Turkey to 
Greece through a combination of repressive and deterrent 
effects, have been strongly criticised, including by the 
Council of Europe28. Human rights abuses have been 
reported by Greek coast guards (pushbacks, shootings, 
killing)29 and in detention (negligence, malnutrition, 
maltreatment). In Turkey there are reports of a lack of 
access to protection and refoulement30.  
For the moment at least the policy of containment has 
been successful on its own terms. In the five months since 
the beginning of April 2016 only 11,662 refugees and 
migrants have crossed the sea to Greece, compared with 
225,505 in the same period last year, a fall of 95%31. Faced 
with making a dangerous crossing across the Aegean 
and then being trapped in Greece, potentially in detention 
and with little or no prospects of employment, many have 
chosen to stay in Turkey and wait to see what happens 
next32. Meanwhile, applications for family reunification have 
increased, most notably to Germany. This is perhaps not 
surprising given the evidence from this research of family 
connections being an important factor shaping intended 
destinations.
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26  See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm 
27  In May 2016 a Syrian asylum seeker won an appeal against a decision that would have led to his readmission to Turkey, underscoring the fundamental  
    shortcomings in the EU-Turkey agreement. See  https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/05/eu-turkey-deal-greek-decision-highlights-fundamental- 
    flaws/
28  Council of Europe (2016) The situation of refugees and migrants under the EU-Turkey agreement of 18 March 2016, Strasbourg: CoE http://assembly.coe. 
    int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22738&lang=en
29  Campbell, Z (2016) ‘Shoot first. Coast Guard fired at migrant Boats, European Border Agency documents show’, The Intercept 22/8/2016,  
    https://theintercept.com/2016/08/22/coast-guard-fired-at-migrant-boats-european-border-agency-documents-show/ https://rm.coe.int/ 
    CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168069aa7f 
30  See https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/10/turkey-border-guards-kill-and-injure-asylum-seekers 
31  Figures correct as at 28th August 2016. See http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 
32  See Crawley, H and Ozerim, G (2016) ‘Selling up, settling down: how a Turkish neighbourhood adapted to its Syrian refugees’, The Conversation https:// 
    theconversation.com/selling-up-settling-down-how-a-turkish-neighbourhood-adapted-to-its-syrian-refugees-60738 
The clearest finding emerging from this research is the striking 
disconnect between the evidence on the drivers of migration 
across the Eastern Mediterranean Route and EU policies of 
containment. Whilst increased arrivals are largely the result 
of conflict and instability in the region, most notably in Syria, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and, most recently, Yemen, they also 
reflect the ‘coming together’ of a number of distinct ‘sub-
flows’ from many countries and regions. These sub-flows are 
made up of individuals and families who have been displaced 
for months and even years looking for a place where they can 
secure protection and an opportunity to rebuild their lives. 
What is often considered a homogeneous flow of refugees 
and migrants across the sea should in reality, therefore, be 
seen as a series of sub-flows that converge in Turkey. The 
failure of EU policies to respond effectively to the increased 
movement of people across the Mediterranean in 2015 was 
in part a problem of implementation but also reflected flawed 
assumptions about the reasons why people move, the factors 
that shape their longer-term migration trajectories and their 
journeys to Europe. There is a need for nuanced, tailored 
and targeted policy responses which reflect these diverse, 
stratified and increasingly complex flows.
The extent to which the policy of containment will continue to 
reduce flows to Greece and the EU remains to be seen. The 
future of the EU-Turkey agreement, already subject to legal 
challenge33, has been brought into serious doubt as a result 
of the attempted Turkish coup of 15th July and subsequent 
political crackdown. Around 100 people arrived in Greece 
each day during August 2016, up from an average of 60 per 
day in July34. It is too early to tell whether this is the beginning 
of an upward trend.  Meanwhile there are 58,635 people 
stranded in Greece many of whom have been unable to 
access procedures for asylum or family reunification35. The 
refugee relocation scheme from Greece, explicitly described 
as an act of European solidarity and responsibility sharing by 
the European Commission,36 has relocated just 2,682 people 
of the 66,400 (4%) originally agreed37. 
Finding protection in Europe remains elusive, even for those 
coming from some of the most desperate war-torn situations 
in the region. These drivers are powerful and seem likely to 
persist into the future. In the absence of safe and legal routes 
to protection for those outside Europe - and a significant 
increase in relocation and family reunification opportunities for 
those who are stuck in Greece – the prospect of a ‘solution’ 
to the Mediterranean migration crisis remains elusive.
Conclusions
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33  See https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/05/eu-turkey-deal-greek-decision-highlights-fundamental-flaws/ 
34  Information on daily and weekly arrivals is available via the UNHCR at http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 
35  Figures correct as at 18th August 2016. See http://migration.iom.int/europe/ 
36  See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/2_eu_solidarity_a_refugee_relo
    cation_system_en.pdf
37  See fn.20
Since September 2015 a team of researchers led by the 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at 
Coventry University working in collaboration with University 
of Birmingham’s Institute for Research into Superdiversity 
and the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford 
University in the UK and partners in Greece (ELIAMEP), 
Italy (FIERI), Turkey (Yasar University) and Malta (People for 
Change Foundation), has been undertaking research into 
the migration crisis at the borders of Southern Europe. 
The MEDMIG project aims to better understand the 
processes which influence, inform and shape migration by 
speaking directly with those who crossed the Mediterranean 
in 2015 and with the numerous state and non-state 
actors who create opportunities and constraints along 
the way. It provides the first large-scale, systematic and 
comparative study of the backgrounds, experiences, 
routes and aspirations of refugees and migrants in three 
EU Member States - Italy, Greece and Malta – and Turkey. 
Our researchers were based in the field from September 
2015 to January 2016, observing events as they unfolded. 
During this time we interviewed 500 refugees and migrants 
travelling via the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes:  
205 in Italy (Sicily, Apulia, Rome, Piedmont, Bologna) and 
20 in Malta (Central Mediterranean route); 215 in Greece 
(Athens, Lesvos) and 60 in Turkey (Izmir, Istanbul) (Eastern 
Mediterranean route). We also interviewed more than 100 
stakeholders, including politicians, policy makers, naval 
officers and coastguards, representatives of international, 
non-governmental and civil society organisations, as well 
as volunteers to gain broader insights into the experiences 
and journeys of the refugees and migrants with whom they 
came into contact.
These four countries enable a comparison of the 
backgrounds, experiences and aspirations of those using 
different routes and contribute to better understanding 
the ways that nationality, economic status and education, 
gender, ethnicity and age shape the journeys and 
experiences of refugees and migrants. This also enables 
us to investigate how migration flows respond to changing 
political opportunities and policy openings led by national 
governments and EU-wide initiatives. Within these 
countries the project employed a purposive sampling 
strategy to ensure that the backgrounds and demographic 
characteristics of respondents were broadly reflective of 
wider trends.
Further information about the MEDMIG project, past 
and forthcoming events and future outputs together with 
contacts details for all of the team members can be found 
on our website www.medmig.info 
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